In his book “Sociology and Philosophy”, Durkheim had a chapter titled “The determination of moral facts” in which he discussed how morality would look like from his sociological approach, or if you will, the sociological source of morality.

Two characteristics of morality

He first pointed out just phenomenologically, that morality consists in a system of rules of conduct, and that compared to other rules (e.g., the rules of any techniques), moral rules have two fundamental characteristics: obligatoriness and desirability. That is, moral rules involve a sense of obligation or duty, but they are also desirable or desired by us.

Durkheim was a known critic of Kant in many ways. A lot of points he made about morality in this chapter were direct responses to Kant. For Kant, morality is primarily identified with obligation or duty, or the categorical imperative which he thought each of us can recognize by the exercise of human reason, without the need to consult our desire, inclination, preference or our conception of happiness. Moreover, in Kant’s ethical theory, the latter (i.e., desire, inclination and preference) are often perceived as obstacles to fullfilling our moral duty. The moral worth of our actions, as he infamously argued in the Groundwork, consists in resisting or overcoming one’s desires, temptation and inclination to do the right thing. So it constitutes a challenge to the Kantian view for Durkheim to argue that moral rules are not only obligatory but also desirable.

Society is the source of morality

Where does our moral sense, i.e., sense of duty or obligation come from? For Kant, the obligatoriness of moral rules is similar to the necessity physical laws, both of which are recognized by our reason. Maybe one difference: Whereas the natural physical laws are inevitably imposed upon us (hence the word “necessity”), the moral laws present themselves as rational requirements which the individual, or the rational agent, has freedom to defy or comply.

Durkheim had a different view here. He placed the source of morality not in individual rationality but in society. He argued that our sense of obligation is derived from social sanctions rather than reasoning. Central to this argument was a comparison he drew between the rules of technique and rules of morality. He pointed out that while there is direct and necessary (negative) consequences to the violation of hygiene rules, no necessary consequences will follow the violation of moral rules such as killing a person. The wrongness of violating the rule of hygiene is thus a logical corollary of the violating act (because one suffers if one ignores hygiene), but that is not the case with the wrongness of moral transgressions. To use Kant’s own terms, Durkheim stated that the relationship between wrongness and act is analytical in the case of violating rules of techniques, but is synthetic in the case of moral transgressions. The synthetic link is created through social sanction (i.e., reward and punishment).It is social sanctions that make certain acts right or wrong in an obligatory sense.

Another part of his view consisted in denying the Kantian claim that individuals are moral ends themselves. Durkheim made a very interesting–though somewhat absurd–argument which went as follows:

a) In our everyday language, “moral acts” never refer to those that benefit the interests or benefits of an individual himself, including self-preservation and self-perfection; b) If acts that benefit oneself have no moral value, and if any other individual is just the same as the individual himself (i.e., the principle of equality), then why acts that benefit another individual (other than oneself) should have any moral value? c) Since the individual is not a moral end or is not the source of moral value/worth, the quantity/number of individuals should not matter, in the same way that 0+0+0 is still 0. So benefiting many other people is not moral either (sort of tried to prove utilitarianism wrong here).

He then proceeded to argue that d) the source of morality must come from society, which is not just a sum of individuals but is a supra entity, or a higher being that transcends all individuals, and is a sui generis collective.

For Durkheim, to think of society as the source of morality can adequately explain morality’s two characteristics: obligatoriness (a sense of duty, obligation) and desirability (good, desirable, ideal, appealing):

Society commands us because it is exterior and superior to us; the moral distance between it and us makes it an authority before which our will defers. But as, on the other hand, it is within us and is us, we love and desire it, albeit with a sui generis desire since, whatever we do, society can never be ours in more than a part and dominates us infinitely. Finally, from the same point of view, we can understand the sacred character which marks and has always marked moral things, the religious character without which no ethic has ever existed.

Durkheim frequently mentioned the notion “sacred” or “sacredness”, arguing that what is sacred actually shares with morality the two characteristics; that is, it appears as obligatory but simultaneously is also desirable and ideal. It seems that Durkheim basically used “society” to replace the position of God in religious accounts of morality.