What are the Capabilities?

In her book Creating Capabilities, Nussbaum stated that the central question the “Capabilities” try to answer is What is each person able to do and to be? To be able to do (or to be) is different from actually doing or being, because one can choose not to do what she is able to do. According to Nussbaum, Capabilities are thus substantial freedoms, rather than actual functionings. She said that “the crucial good societies should be promoting is a set of opportunities, substantial freedoms, which people may or may not exercise in action: the choice is theirs”(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 18). Since self-determination or freedom of choice is a defining characteristic of the Capabilities, CA is therefore against the paternalistic view:

Some political views deny this: they hold that the right thing for government to do is to make people lead healthy lives, do worthwhile activities, exercise religion and so on. We deny this: we say capablities, not functionings, are the appropriate political goals, because room is thereby left for the exercise of human freedom. There’s a huge moral difference between a policy that promotes health and one that promotes health capabilities–the latter, not the former, honors the person’s lifestyle choices (p. 25).

Can Capabilities be equated with a person’s abilities? Nussbaum’s answer is no. She argued that Capabilities consist of not just inner abilities, or abilities residing within a person, but also opportunities created by the social and political environment for individuals to exercise their personal abilities. She distinguished between internal capabilities which basically referred to relatively stable characteristics of persons such as personal abilities, skills, personality traits and emotional states, etc., and combined capabilities which are “freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and the political, social and economical environment” (p. 20). Capabilities, in her theory, are combined capabilities or “substantial freedoms”.

The distinction between internal and combined capabilities is important, because it is perfectly possible for us to have internal capabilities (e.g., the ability to engage in philosophical investigation) while being offered no opportunities in our social life to exercise them, due to (for instance) political suppression. On the other hand it seems also possible that a society can provide opportunities or freedoms for citizens to engage in certain activities and yet does not do much to cultivate and develop the capabilities needed for those activities.

Here’s the ten central capabilities that Nussbaum argued “a decent political order must secure to all citizens” (p. 33-34) at least at threshold level:

1. Life
   Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length, not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2. Bodily health
   Being able to have good heath, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily integrity
   Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and choice in matters of reproduction.
4. Sense, imagination and thought
   Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think and reason–to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by gurantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.
5. Emotions
   Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that are cucial in their development.)
6. Practical reason
   Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)
7. Affiliation
   (A). Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interactions; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.) (B). Having the social basis of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination of the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion and national origin.
8. Other species
   Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play
   Being able to laugh, to play, and to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control over one’s environment
    (A) Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation; protections of free speech and association. (B) Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods.), having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.

A Quick Evaluation

One apparent advantage of the CA is that it attends to multiple areas or dimensions of human life and sees all of them as constitutive of individual well-being or a quality life, instead of measuring life quality and well-being by one single criteria such as GDP per capita, or economic good.

Compared to Rawls’ theory, the ten Capabilities provide a relatively richer and thicker conception of the good, than Rawls’ set of primary goods, including income, wealth and social respect, which is thought to be all-purpose goods, namely, things it is rational for people to have no matter what their particular conceptions of good life or life plans are (Rawls, 1971). But the kind of conception of the good expressed in the CA is not so rich and thick as to confine individuals to a narrow set of substantial lifestyles or ways of living. In other words, although in CA the right is defined by the good, it has been argued that there is plenty of space for pluralistic expressions of the good (the Capabilities). However, it is questionable whether the list of capabilities actually implicitly endorses a particular lifestyle and discourages others. It may be argued, for instance, the Capabilities essentially reflect only western values such as individualism, self-determination, etc., and thus cannot serve as a criteria for the justice of all societies and cultures.

While some people worry that the conception of the good involved in the Capabilities is still too substantial and thereby constraining, others may find it too loose and empty to be substantial enough. If health is a good, then why don’t we just make sure that everybody lead a healthy lifestyle? If political participation is a good or a human capability, why don’t we just make sure that everyone exercise that capability as much as possible? The liberal notion of self-determination which the Capabilities are predicated upon, they would argue, is counterproductive to the actualization of the goods.